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20C ANNALS OF IOWA
THE CASE OF AECHIE P. WEBB, A FREE NEGRO.
BY NATHAN E. COFFIN.
In Polk County litigation one of t'he judicial reviews that
was of keenest local interest, and under a different combina-
tion of circtimstances might have been as famous as the Dred
Scott case, is that entitled "Archie P. Webb vs. I. W.
Griffith.'" The judge, John Henry Gray, was born in Prince
George's County, Maryland, October 16, 1831, and was only
thirty-one years of age when he rendered this opinion. His
ancestors came to that state with Lord Baltimore, and were
prominent in building up some of the towns on the Potomac
and Patuxent Rivers, among which were Benedict and Leonard
Town.
Having passed through the common school with much credit
to himself, he entered Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsyl-
vania, where he graduated Avith honors in 1853. Subsequently
he studied law and was admitted to practice in Newark, Ohio.
In a few months he went to Fort Wayne, Indiana, where, in
May, 1855, he was married to Miss Maria Freeman, a native
of Massachusetts, who was at that time Preceptress in Fort
Wayne Male and Female College. Miss Freeman graduated
at the Wesleyan Seminary, Wilbraham, Massachusetts, and
came West as a teacher in 1852, under the auspices of the
National Board of Popular Education. Immediately after
their marriage Mr. Gray and his wife started for Des Moines,
Iowa.
In the fall of 1856, Mr. Gray was elected Prosecuting Attor-
ney of Polk County, which place he filled until he was elected
Judge of the Fifth Judicial District in 1*858. Having served
the people faithfully during one term, he was re-elected in
1862 by a large majority, and, though in failing health, con-
tinued his ofticial M'ork until a few days before his death,
which occurred on October 14, 1865, at his home in Des
Moines.
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Archie P. Webb, while employed as a laborer in Delaware
township. Polk County, and quietly earning his livelihood,
was notified by a gang of persecutors to leave the State. This
he refused to do. By order of the Justice of the Peace he
was arrested, fined, and sent to jail. He was forthwith re-
leased by a writ of habeas corpus, issued by Judge Gray, and
when the case was brought before him, the Judge gave it a
patient hearing, and with a full appreciation of its import-
ance, bestowed upon it thoughtful attention.
Chapter 32, Acts of the Third General Assembly, which was
the basis of the suit, is as follows:
AN ACT to prohibit the immigration of free negroes into this
State :
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State
of Iowa, That from and after the passage of this act, no free negro
or mulatto, shall be permitted to settle in this State.
Sec. 2. It shall be the duty of all township and county officers,
to notify all free negroes who may immigrate to this State, to leave
the same within three days from the time of notice, and upon their
failure to do so, it shall be the duty of the constable of the proper
township, sheriff of the county, marshal or other police officer of
the town, to arrest such free negro, and take him or her before a
justice of the peace or county judge, and it shall be the duty of
such justice or judge to fine such free negro, the sum of two dollars,
for each day he may remain in the State after such notice, and
costs of such prosecution; and to commit such free negro to the
jail of the county or the nearest one thereto, until such fine and
costs are paid, or until he will consent to leave the state; Provided,
it shall be ascertained that he or she is unable to pay such fine or
costs.
Sec. 3. That all free negroes now living in this State, who
have complied with the laws now in force, shall be permitted to
remain here, and enjoy such property as they may now possess, or
may hereafter acquire.
Sec. 4. On the trial of any free negro under this act, the justice
or judge shall determine from, and irrespective of his person,
whether the person on trial comes under the denomination of free
negro or mulatto.
Sec. 5. This act to take effect, and be in force, by publication in
the Iowa True Democrat, a weekly newspaper published in Mount
Pleasant.
Approved Fehruary 5th, 1851.
202 ANNALS OF IOWA
The petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed January
20, 1863, in Polk county, alleged that the defendant was
sheriff of Polk County, Iowa ; that plaintiff, Archie P. Webb,
was imprisoned in the Polk County jail and that according
to his best information and belief he was so restrained under
a pretended order issued by Stephen Harvey, a justice of
the peace in Delaware Township, Polk County, Iowa, and
that said order purported to be issued by virtue of proceed-
ings a-gainst plaintiff as a free negro living in the State of
Iowa after notice to leave; that said restraint was illegal
because plaintiff was not arrested on any warrant for the
commission of any crime and was allowed no trial by jury
and did not waive a trial by jury; that he was tried for
no crime or offense against the laws of Iowa or the United
States and was confronted with no witnesses and was ordered
imprisoned without proof or trial and fined in the sum of
Twelve Dollars and costs and in default of payment was or-
dered imprisoned as aforesaid; and that these illegal proceed-
ings Avere had on the 20th day of January, A. D. 1863. Plain-
tiff further alleged that he was informed and believed that
the proceedings were void and of no effect and that the pre-
tended law under which the proceedings were had, was never
in force and was unconstitutional and void. Wherefore he
asked that a Avrit of habeas corpus issue in order that h'e might
be discharged from imprisonment. The petition is sworn to
and the affidavit is signed by Webb in a clear and legible hand.
Stephen Sibley appeared as attorney for plaintiff.
Six days later, Webb filed an amendment to his original pe-
tition in which amendment he sets out a copy of the order of
the writ issued by Justice Harvey to the sheriff of Polk Coun-
ty, Iowa, commanding the sheriff: to receive Webb into custody
and detain him in the Polk County jail until legally discharged
because of his default to answer to the fine of Twelve Dollars
and costs amounting to $2.90. In this amendment, Webb fur-
ther alleges that his restraint is illegal in that he was arrested
upon no warrant, nor in the act of committing any crime and
that no information was filed before said justice of any char-
acter whatever; and that he was accused before said justice
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of no crime whatever; and that he was ordered imprisoned
without any trial whatever; and without the production of a
single witness against him; and was imprisoned without due
process of law and without a trial by jury and without the
benefit of any counsellor at law ; and further alleges that he is
informed and believes that said pretended trial and proceed-
ings were under and by virtue of a pretended law that the
State of Iowa passed February 5, 1851, to prohibit the immi-
gration of free negroes into this State, which he avers is not a
valid, constitutional or existing law in this State. Wherefore
he asks to be granted his liberty.
Upon the filing of the petition. Judge J. H. Gray issued an
order directed to I. W. Griffith, Sheriff of Polk County, Iowa,
commanding him to have the body of Archie P. Webb before
the court at 9:00 A. M. of the 21st day of January, A. D. 1863.
The sheriff app°eared in person and by his attorney J. S. Polk
and stated that he now had the body of the said Archie P.
Webb before his honor J. II. Gray, Judge, and was detaining
him under and by virtue of a writ issued 'by S. Harvey, Jus-
tice of the Peace. Sheriff Griffith also filed an answer, setting
up a copy of said writ. The cause appears to have been tried
before Judge Gray, and the court upon due consideration or-
dered the defendant released on the 2d day of February, 1863.
Webb also appears to have appealed to the district court
from the fine, in January, 1863, but this appeal was probably
dropped. Both parties filed bills of exceptions in the Habeas
Corpus case so as to have the record in shape for an appeal.
It is shown in the plaintiff's bill of exceptions that the plain-
tiff introduced one James Wright, a witness who testified that
he was Secretary of State for the State of Iowa and had
searched his office for any certificate of publication of the laws
passed by the Third General Assembly of the State, exclusive
of the code, as well as for any certificate for the distribution
of said laws and also for any certificate of the publication in
the True Democrat newspaper of an act entitled "An act to
prohibit the immigration of Free Negroes to the State," and
no certificate of any of the above mentioned facts could be
found in his office. And plaintiff's attorney also introduced
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the pamphlet edition of the said session laws wherein there is
no certificate of publication of said act in said True Democrat,
nor is there printed nor appended to said volume any certifi-
cate of publication or the distribution of said law. As these
matters were not included in the bill of exceptions filed by the
defendant Griffith, the judge made them also a part of the
record, upon request of plaintiff.
The defendant's bill of exceptions merely recited that the
only evidence offered and read to the court was the plaintiff's
admissions that he was born a slave in the state of Mississippi
but was a free negro and immigrated to the State of Iowa from
the State of Arkansas since 1861 and that he had taken an
appeal from the justice court to the district court in the case
in which the fine was levied; and that the mittimus under
which he was imprisoned was in due form of law.
The defendant through his attorneys, Casa,dy & Polk, served
notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, but the case
was evidently never docketed in the Supreme Court, as it does
not appear in list of decided cases as found in McClain's Iowa
Digest, nor in the Supreme Court reports. It is the recollec-
tion of the family of Judge Gray, however, that the case was
appealed and was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The opinion in full, rendered by Judge J. H. Gray on Feb-
ruary 2, 1863, was published in the Iowa State Register next
day, and was as follows:
P. WEBB, VS. I. W. GBIFFITH, SHERIFF:—This cause came
before me in vacation, and at the suggestion of defendant's counsel,
an agreement was entered into with the counsel for the plaintiff to
continue the hearing thereof until the first day of the present term
of court. The facts are hriefly these: The plaintiff herein was
notified hy one of the trustees of Delaware township, in Polk
county, to leave the State within three days. He refused. An order
was made hy Stephen Harvey, a justice of the peace, in and for said
township, for the plaintiff's arrest The sheriff arrested him, took
him hefore the said justice, and he was then tried and fined in the
sum of twelve dollars and costs and sent to jail until he should pay
the fine and costs or consent to leave the State. In vacation a writ
was issued to the sheriff to bring the plaintiff hefore me to inquire
into the legality of his imprisonment. On the trial it was agreed
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.that plaintiff is a free negro, born in the United States, and that he
came from the State of Arkansas to this State since the passage ot
the law of 1851 excluding free negroes from this State. Upon these
facts this cause is submitted to this court. This action arises under
that which purports to be a law enacted by the Third General
Assembly of the State of Iowa, held in January, 1851, and entitled,
"An Act to prohibit the immigration of Free Negroes into this
State," and approved February 5, 1851. The first- section thereof
exeludes free negroes and mulattoes, from and after-the passage of
this act, from settling in this State. The second section ma^kes it
"the duty of all township and county officers to notify all. free
negroes who may immigrate to this State, to leave the same within
three days from the time of notice, and upon their failure so to do,
it shall be the duty of the constable of the proper township, sheriff
of the county, marshal or other police officer of the town, to arrest
such free negro and take him or her before a justice of the peace
or county judge, and it shall be the duty of such justice or judge
to fine such free negro the sum of two dollars for each day he may
remain in the State after such notice, and costs of such prosecution,
and to commit such free negro to the jail of the county or to the
nearest one thereto, until such fine and costs are paid, or until he
will consent to leave the State; provided that it shall be ascertained
that he or she is unable to pay such fine and costs." The third
section provides that "all free negroes now living in this State who
have complied with the laws now in force, shall be permitted to
remain," etc. The fourth section provides "that on the trial of any
such free negro under this act, the justice or judge shall determine
from and irrespective of his person, whether the person on trial
comes under the denomination of free negro and mulatto." The
fifth section provides for its publication, and says, "that it shall
take effect and be in force by publication in the Iowa True
Democrat."
The time consumed in the argument, the ability and zeal mani-
fested by the counsel on either side, the very considerable interest
manifested by the public and the importance necessarily attached to
this case have induced the court to give it a patient hearing and
justify an opinion in writing upon the material points urged. In
doing so the court will indulge in no evasion nor adlnit of any
equivocation.
The questions to be determined in the case pertain to the validity
of this law, and the main points urged by counsel are embraced in
the following inquiries:
1st. Has the court jurisdiction of this case?
2d. Is this law in confiict with the Constitution of the United
States?
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3d. Did it conflict with the old Constitution of this State under
which it was enacted?
4th. Has it ever been repealed, either hy subsequent legislation
or hy the adoption of our new Constitution?
5th. Was the law ever legally published?
I.—Has this court jurisdiction to hear and determine this case on
writ of habeas corpus? There can be no doubt of the proposition
urged by defendant's counsel that where a justice of the peace, or
inferior court, has jurisdiction of a cause, and proceeds to try and
deterifiine the same and render final judgment, that a superior court
will not review such proceedings on writ of habeas corpus. Had
this justice the jurisdiction to try and determine this cause? Sec-
tion 4427 of the revision says that "A crime or public offense in the
meaning of this Code is any act or omission forbidden by law and to
which is annexed upon conviction thereof a punishment." Section
4432 of the revision says that "every offense must be prosecuted by
indictment, except—1st, Offenses of public ofBcers, when a different
mode of procedure is prescribed by law; 2d, Offenses exclusively
within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, or of police or city
courts; 3rd, Offenses in cases arising in the army," &c. Every
offense, therefore, that does not come within some one of these three
exceptions, the law says must be prosecuted by indictment. Is this
case embraced in either one of these exceptions? No one can con-
tend that it is embraced in either, unless it be in the 2nd. Then is
it an offense exclusively within the jurisdiction of a justice of the
peace or of a police or city court? It cannot he exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the justice when the law says in terms expressly
that either a justice or a county judge shall have jurisdiction to
•hear and determine the case. It cannot be asserted that a county
judge can hold either a police or city court. Therefore, it being a
public offense—neither within the exclusive jurisdiction of a justice,
or city or police court—it must be prosecuted hy indictment. But
should it he contended that the sections to which the court has
referred are in conflict with the eleventh section of the Bill of Rights
of the new constitution—a question which is not here decided—then
had the justice jurisdiction under that section, which says that his
jurisdiction in criminal causes shall extend only to a flne of one
hundred dollars or imprisonment for thirty days? Clearly not.
For, suppose the plaintiff to have had notice to leave the State and i
did not leave, but remained here two months or sixty days after he
received such notice and before he was arrested! Suppose him then
to have been arrested and brought before the justice under this
law!—what would have been his duty? First, to have found him
guilty; then the number of days he had remained since notice, and
then to impose the flne of two dollars per day—for such the law
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says he shall do. What would have been the flne in such case?
Certainly viore than one hundred dollars, and this the justice, by the
positive terms of this law, could not escape. A justice, under this
section, has no jurisdiction to hear and finally determine any offense
the penalty to which can, on any contingency, exceed the sum of one
hundred dollars or thirty days' imprisonment. The Court is there-
fore of the opinion that the justice had not jurisdiction to finally
determine this case and that the cause is properly before this Court.
II.—Was this Act of the Legislature a violation of the second
clause of the fourth Article of the Constitution of the United States,
which says: "That the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the.several States"?
The Court understands this to mean that the citizens of any one
State have the right to go into any other State and enjoy the same
privileges that such State has conferred upon its own citizens of the
same description—(See 2nd Kent, 7th ed., page 35.) To illustrate: —
If citizen women or minors from another State come to Iowa—and
they have the same privileges here as are given by the laws of this
State to women and minors in Iowa—if, therefore, the Constitution
or paramount law of this State withholds the privilege of the elec-
tive franchise from women and minors in Iowa, the same descrip-
tion of citizens subsequently immigrating to' Iowa cannot claim that
privilege. But they are entitled to all other privileges not thus ex-
pressly denied to such citizens in this State. And if the Constitution
secures to them all privileges not thus expressly denied—how much
more does it secure to them absolute and natural rights expressly
guaranteed by the Constitution of this State to all such citizens in
this State! Or to more aptly illustrate: If free negroes, born in
allegiance to the United States, are citizens of the United States, and
residing in any other State, remove from thence to this State, they,
have all the privileges that are not expressly withheld by the laws of
Iowa from free negroes residing in Iowa; and if the Constitution of
the United States thus secures to them such privileges how much
more does it secure all natural and absolute rights, which are
guaranteed by the Constitution of this State to such citizens in this
State? But it is urged that a negro, though he be free and was born
in the United States, of parents whose ancestors were here at the
time of the Revolution and thereafter remained loyal to this Govern-
ment, is, nevertheless, not a citizen within the meaning of the Con-
stitution of the United States. A question of so much importance,
rendered complex by precedents of great authority on both sides, and
urged at a time when the nation struggles as in the agonies of
death, and when the horrors of civil war remind us of our mis-
fortunes relative to this unfortunate race, presents no pleasant or
easy task for a court. But it is far better that it be settled by the
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courts of this State soon—that the question may be at rest—and
the validity of this law determined. Nearly all the authorities
cited upon this question are reviewed or alluded to in a note to
Kent's Commentaries (vol. 2, 7th ed., page 278), and the doctrine is
there laid down, that citizens under our Constitutions and Laws
mean free inhabitants, born within the United States, or naturalized
by the laws of Congress; that negroes born free, or slaves native
born but manumitted, are citizens, but under such disabilities as
may be imposed by the laws of a State. The authorities upon this
question are divided, and as every freeman born in allegiance to
this Government is, or ought to be, considered prima facie a citizen,
a safer conclusion may be drawn from a consideration of the rea-
sons urged to deprive such a person of his citizenship.
III.—The reasons urged for the support of the doctrine that free,
native born persons of color are not citizens of the United States
are: l s t^They are a degraded race; 2d—They are not in any of
the States admitted to all the privileges and immunities of white
citizens; 3d—That they were not represented in that body which
formed our National Constitution and therefore are not embraced in
the words, "We, the people," &c., which are the first words of our
Constitution. As to the first of these reasons: It is more a ques-
tion of history than of law, and I propose to leave to history that
which in my judgment can in no wise affect the law. It may be
submitted to the enlightened conscience and the determination of
a Christian world whether a race of men forced from home to
foreign shores, which they never sought, and sold into b^ondage,
should be more despised than pitied. The second reason urged is:
That they are not in any of the States admitted to all the rights
and immunities of white citizens. Suppose that be true. D'oes it
follow that they are not citizens? The privileges usually withheld
from them by a majority of the States are those of voting, holding
office, being militiamen and attending school with white children, and
the Court is of the opinion without doubt that these privileges may
be legally and properly withheld from them by the laws of any
State. There is a distinction between rights and privileges. The
Constitution guarantees to us our natural rights and the means of
enjoying them. But it. may confer or withhold political privileges
and such are those we have enumerated. Do not the Constitution
and laws of nearly all the States withhold privileges from some and
confer them upon others of their white citizens? In nearly all the
States the laws create certain offices, as for instance Governor; but
withhold the privilege of any white peison from holding it until
he arrives at a certain age. Yet, they are citizens before they attain
that age, though not eligible to that privileged position. Will it do
to say that because the elective franchise is withheld from some.
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yea, many white citizens—that therefore they are not citizens?
The Constitution neither by letter nor spirit has imposed any such
conditions for citizenship. It leaves to the several States the
right to bestow or withhold the elective franchise as a privilege upon
the citizens thereof, as each State may see proper. And each State
hy its constitution has declared who shall and who shall not enjoy
that privilege. Hence all the States exclude females and minors
from voting; and some of the States formerly confined the privilege
of voting to owners of real estate. Some of them now impose
property qualifications upon adult white citizens as a requisite to the
privilege of voting. The right to base the privilege of voting upon
such a condition, is coupled with the right to entirely withhold it—
because the subject may never be able to perform the condition,
and therefore never able to enjoy the right depending upon it.
Will anyone maintain that females, and native white persons whose
right to the elective franchise thus depended upon conditions which
they have never performed—have not the constitutional right to go
. into any of the States over which that Constitution extends its
authority? Suppose the Legislature of the State of Iowa to have
passed a law excluding from Iowa all adult native white men of the
State of Virginia, whose right to vote in that State depended upon
a property qualification, imposed hy the laws of Virginia, which
they never possessed and were therefore not voters in that State;
would it be contended that they were not citizens of the United
States, because their poverty had prevented their voting in Virginia,
and that therefore the law so excluding them was valid? Or sup-
pose it excluded females and minors from the State—would it be
contended that the fundamental principles securing the right to life,
liberty and property, laid down in the Constitution, do not go with
them and protect them in every State of this Union, though no
State has conferred on them the privilege of voting? I urge this to
show that the authorities most fully sustain—that citizenship under
the Constitution of the United States does not in any manner depend
upon the right to vote or upon privileges granted. That by virtue of
a man or woman being born in allegiance to this Government, and
heing free—the Constitution confers upon him or her the high pre-
rogative of citizenship—requires of all their support in whatever
State they may be found, and guarantees to each its protection in
"whatever State he or she may enter. The third reason upon which
this doctrine has been urged remains to be considered. That is.
that thev were not represented in that body which formed our
National Constitution, and therefore are not embraced in the words,
"We, the people," which are the flrst words of our Constitution. At
the time of the ratification of the articles of confederation all free
native-born inhabitants of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
9
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York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, who had other necessary
qualifications, though descended from African slaves, were not only
citizens but voters in each of those States. When the Articles of
Confederation were under consideration by Congress, a member
from South Carolina offered to amend the fourth article by inserting
after the word "free" and before the word "inhabitant" the word
"white" so that the article would then read the "free white inhabi-
tants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from
justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of free citizens in the several States," &c. But it was voted dovm
by a large majority. Thus these persons still exercised the rights of
citizens and even voted in those States under the Confederation.
When, therefore, these States were called upon to send delegates or
representatives to that body which framed our National Constitution,
it is reasonable to suppose that these same colored freemen in those
States exercised the privilege of suffrage—at least they enjoyed the
right so to do. It therefore follows that they who represented those
states represented- all who had the privilege of the elective fran-
chise in those States. And it is untrue that they were not a part
of the people so represented. Nay, more: In those States above
mentioned, they had the privilege of voting and doubtless did vote
upon the ratification' of our Constitution. After an examination of
the authorities upon this question, together with the reasons upon
which they are founded, it appears that a native-born free man of
color, whether born free or a slave and manumitted, is a citizen
within the meaning of the National Constitution.
If therefore they be citizens of the United States, they are entitled
to all the rights -guaranteed to, and privileges conferred upon, citi-
zens of the same description in this State. What rights are guar-
anteed to such citizens in this State by the Constitution thereof?
What privileges are withheld from them by our Constitution and
laws? ' The privileges withheld are those of the elective franchise,
to hold office and to be militiamen. The rights guaranteed to such
citizens in this State by the Constitution under which this law was
enacted are, those of "enjoying and defending life and liberty, ac-
quiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness." And these rights are guaranteed
to such citizens in this State who resided here at the adoption of
the Old Constitution. Therefore under the Constitution of the
United States the same description of citizens in other States could
enjoy these rights in this State.' The Constitution of this State is
in perfect harmony with the Constitution of the United States in
denying to free negroes the privilege of voting, of holding office and
being militiamen. But the Legislature had no right to pass a law
denying them the right to live in the State when the Constitution
guarantees this right to all such citizens in this State at its
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adoption. But stress may be placed upon the words "citizens of
each State" in this clause, that, therefore, this plaintiff not being a
citizen of the State of Arkansas is not referred to or embraced
under the meaning of this clause. But free negroes are citizens of
some of the New England States by the laws thereof. Hence, this
law if valid, would equally exclude them though citizens of those
States. But if this clause refers only to citizens in the sense of
citizens of a State merely—then it is equally invalid because it
excludes a description of persons who are citizens in some States
by the laws thereof. But it cannot he valid as to the citizens of
some of the States, and inoperative as to others. If there be one
State, the citizens whereof it cannot exclude, neither can it exclude
the same description of citizens in any other State. If therefore they
have the right to reside in the State and possess property here, how
can they enjoy these rights in Iowa when the law, if valid, says
that they shall not enter the State, directs its officers to arrest and
flne them, and forces upon them the entertainment and hospitality
of our jails?
IV.—Was this law a violation of the old Constitution of this
State under which it was enacted? Article 1st of the Bill of Rights
says that "All men are by nature free and independent, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are life and liberty—acquir-
ing, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness." For whose heneflt was this clause adopted?
. Manifestly for all men who were and should thereafter be a part
and portion of the PEOPLE of Iowa. What is here meant by all men?
The term deflnes itself—it can mean nothing less than all the human
race, and when used in this clause means such of the human race
as may he within the bounds of the State of Iowa. It is not hard to
see that a negro is one of the human race, hut it is very diflicult to
see how he can enjoy the right of life, liberty, acquire, possess, and
protect property, and obtain happiness and safety in the State of
Iowa when the law banishes him from the State. It will be ob-
served that there can he no nice technicalities about citizenship
here, for the term used is, all me». But again. Section 8, of the
Bill of Rights says "that the right of the people to he secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures
and searches shall not be violated. Is a law reasonable that arrests
and imprisons a man where the only crime eharged is that he is a
freeman and has settled in the State of Iowa? And where the only
issue that can he tried is, is he a free negro or mulatto? And has he
come to Iowa since the passage of this law? And has he had notice
to leave the State? If this law authorizes a reasonable seizure, then
what would he an unreasonable seizure? But again. Section 10 of
the old Constitution says that in ALL criminal prosecutions the
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accused shall have a right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury and
be informed of the accusation, agaiinst him." It cannot be main-
tained that this is not a criminal prosecution, for the law itself
directs, flrst, a notice to leave, then his arrest, then his trial, then
a flne and payment of all "costs of the prosecution," and then his
imprisonment. What more can be added to complete a criminal
prosecution? But the Constitution says: "In AUJ criminal prosecU'
tions." If this is one, then It is clearly embraced in the term "all,"
and is covered directly by this clause. It says that the accused
shall have the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury. Here
no technical doubts can arise, either as to citizenship, color or con-
dition, for the language is plain. It is "the accused shall have", etc.
This law fixes upon the negro the accusation and designates him
as the accused. Then the Constitution says he shall have the right
to a speedy trial by an impartial JURY. But what does this law say?
It says that "on the trial of any free negro under this act, the
justiee or judge shall determine from, and irrespective of his person,
whether the person on trial comes under the denomination of a free
negro or mulatto." How can he have an impartial trial by jury,
when the law says that the justice or judge shall determine the only
issue that can be tried? Can a law so at variance with the Consti-
tution be valid? But can this section of the law be void and the
remaining sections of it be in force? By close attention to the
reading of the law it will be observed that this is the only section
that legally defines the crime by stating the issue to be tried. A
law that only fixes a penalty without defining the crime, when it is
one of statutory creation and unknown to common law, is inqpera-
tive and void, and such is the case with this law under the consti-
tution in force at its enactment.
V.—As to the repeal of this law, but a word need be added.
What has been said relative to the old Constitution applies with
still greater force under the new Constitution, and if the law had
been in force under a Constitution allowing its enactment—it would
have been repealed by the adoption of our new Constitution. Section
4426 of the revision says that "all laws coming within the purview
of this act, shall become repealed when this act goes into effect,
except as hereinafter provided." The Court is of the opinion that
the fourth section of this act does come within the purview of
Section 4432, which says that "eivery public offense must be prose-
cuted by indictment, except (see 2d clause) offenses exclusively
within the jurisdiction of justices of the peace or of police or city
courts, etc., and that, therefore, so much of this law was thereby
repealed. This section being the only one legally stating the issue
to be tried, or crime, created by the law, the law itself is therefore
rendered of no effect.
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The position assumed, that the law was repealed by non user, is
so untenable as to need no refutation. For the law is well settled
that before custom can make or non user repeal a law, either must
be of such duration as that the memory of men runneth not to the
contrary. The fact that the law has remained a dead letter and has
not been enforced for twelve years is not a sufficient non user
to repeal it.
The last inquiry is as to whether this law, if valid, was ever
legally published. The evidence before the court shows clearly that
the Session Laws of 1851 were distributed as required by the law,
though there are informalities about the evidence of that fact. The
position that the law authorizes its taking effect "by publication"
in a newspaper, and that it was never so published, and therefore it
never did become a law, is in the opinion of the court equally un-
founded. The code passed at that session, made provision for the
taking effect of all laws not published as directed in newspapers.
This construction certainly introduces too technical a practice, and
therefore should not maintain. If therefore the law had been valid,
it would have gone into effect as did other laws of that session.
Having thus disposed of all material points urged by counsel the
judgment of the Court is that the law under which the plaintiff was
arrested is inoperative and void; that the proceedings thereunder
were therefore unauthorized, that the plaintiff herein is entitled to
his liberty, and that he is hereby discharged from imprisonment.
Of the opinion rendered in the case editorial comment ran
as follows: .
We publish in full in this issue of the REGISTER the Decision
of Judge Gray, rendered on the 2d inst. in the case of ARCHIE P.
WEBB. The case was one of great interest, and the Judge, with a
full appreciation of its importance, has bestowed upon it thoughtful
- attention. His opinion is one of marked ability, and will be read
with satisfaction by every citizen who cares to see justice impar-
tially administered among men.
What other scheme of rascality the miserable demagogues who
impelled this prosecution will attempt next, time will probably
develop. They have been marked by a reading and thinking public,
and will 'nOt be soon forgiven or forgotten!^
(Special Dispatch to the Chicago Tribune.)
Des Moines, Iowa, Feb. 2d, 1863.—Judge Gray of the District
Court today read his decision in the habeas corpus case of the
negro, Archie P. Webb. The court house was filled by an anxious
lEdltorlal, Des Moines Daily State Register, February 3, 1863.
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audience, and the reading of the decision was listened to with
breathless attention. The Judge held that under the Constitution of
the United States a free negro is entitled to the rights of citizen-
ship; that Archie P. Webb is a free negro, and as such entered
the State of Iowa; that the act of 1851, under which he had heen
arrested and imprisoned, was in fiagrant violation of the old Con-
stitution then in force, and the new, which is now the fundamental
law of the State, and overrides the plainest principles of the com-
mon law. He held the act to be null and void, and his decision,
therefore, was that Archie has been unwarrantably arrested and
imprisoned, and must be immediately set at liberty.
The opinion had been prepared with care and will he published
In full. Thus has ended a wicked scheme of a gang of semi-traitors
to inaugurate a general system of persecution against the free ne-
groes in this State, and to that extent embarrass the execution of
the President's Emancipation Proclamation in the Mississippi Valley
The Burlington Hawk-Eye published a lengthy article upon
this decision from whieh the following is quoted :
The Judge gave his opinion today. It was elaborate and forcible,
covering all the ground necessary to a complete vindication of
the right of every mian to liberty who has not forfeited it hy crime.
With a frankness and holdness that does him honor. Judge Gray
met the case before him. He rejoiced in the opportunity to estah-
lish in this case the unity of justice and law. The people of Iowa
will thank Judge Gray for vindicating the charter of their liberties,
and throwing the shield of the law over the weak and helpless, who
have sought a refuge in our midst. When he decreed the freedom
of Archie P. Webb, and snapped the meshes that had been so art-
fully thrown around a^n innocent and unoffending man, he gave a
verdict that wili he sustained by the highest legal tribunals of the
Country and the chancery of fleaven.
25 CENTS REWARD.
Ran away from the subscriber on the night of'the 19th
instant, an indented apprentice, named DENA KILLING,
about 12 years of age. Any person returning said appren-
tice shall receive the above reward but no charges.
ELIJAH BUEL.
Lyons, Sept. 25, '39.
—Iowa Sun, Davenport, November 13, 1839.

